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THE RACE CONVENTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS
IN THE UNITED STATES
Theodore M. Shawt
I would like to say a few preliminary things. First, it has been a
great honor this academic year to hold the Haywood Burns Chair
here at the City University of New York School of Law. Haywood is
somebody I never grow tired of talking about, because those of you
who knew Haywood, know he was an extraordinary human being
and an extraordinary warrior. He was also a great example in
terms of melding an academic career with a career as a practitioner
and an activist. So Haywood was one of my heroes.
When I was asked to be the second recipient of the Haywood
Burns Chair I could not say no, even though I had no business
saying yes given everything that was on my plate. The first chair
holder of the Haywood Burns Chair was Judge Nathaniel Jones,
who is another individual I admire a great deal and who will be
with us tomorrow. I thought maybe with Haywood's name and
Judge Jones' name somehow connected with my name I might rise
up in the world a little bit, and I have.
In the annals of American jurisprudence, Brown v. Board of Ed-
ucation1 stands as a case of singular significance. Brown breathed
life into the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,2 which had long served to protect the interests of corpora-
tions while its original purpose-to guarantee that African-
Americans would be treated by the United States Government as
all others without regard to race-was shamelessly frustrated.
Brown was decided at a moment during American history when sev-
eral forces converged to create a context in which the Supreme
t Associate Director-Counsel of the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund,
Inc. J.D., 1979, Columbia University School of Law; B.A., Wesleyan University. These
remarks were made at Bringing It Home: Building International Human Rights Law, Advo-
cacy and Culture, A Conference to Mark the 50th Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, held at the City University of New York School of Law, 1 May-3 May
1998.
1 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment provides, "No state shall.., deny to any person within its jurisdic-
tion the equal protection of the laws." Id. The Court in Brown held that segregated
schools were inherently unequal and that they deprived African-American students of
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. 347 U.S. at
495.
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
Court's ability to declare an end to the pernicious doctrine of sepa-
rate but equal, announced in Plessy v. Ferguson,3 finally came into
being.
The United States emerged victoriously from World War II as
a superpower that had fought against Nazi Germany, which had
annihilated millions in its quest for racial purity. If there is ever
such a thing as a 'just war" I suppose we could say World War II was
such a thing. Regardless of what one thinks about whether there is
such a thing as a 'just war," clearly the judgment of history is that
America was on the right side. African-Americans fought and died
to liberate Europe from the yoke of Nazi oppression and to defeat
the Japanese in Asia. Yet at the same time they and their loved
ones were denied freedom and equality at home.
The irony and hypocrisy of this contradiction was not lost on
most Black people and was also seen by many white Americans.
Judge Leon Higgenbothem, who served on the United States Court
of Appeals for the Third Circuit, recalled how a young man, John
Oak Franklin, who is now heading up the President's race commis-
sion or advisory panel, traveled through North Carolina from
Greensboro to Durham one day. While he was on the train, he was
compelled to stand even though there were ample seats for people
to sit in. In the adjacent coach, there were a lot of empty seats and
Judge Higgenbothem stood while some white Nazi prisoners of war
sat in a car reserved for white people, grinning at his discomfort.
Richard Klueger, in his wonderful book Simple Justice,4 suc-
cinctly observed that " [B]lack Americans did not possess the rights
for which they and their nation fought the Second World War, and
they knew it."5 Black soldiers were among the liberators of the con-
centration camps where millions of Jews were murdered. They wit-
nessed the horrors of the Holocaust first hand. A few years ago, in
1993, there was a documentary commemorating the role of Black
American troops liberating the concentration camps at Buchen-
wald and Dachau.' This history was recounted at a time when
Black-Jewish relationships in the United States were particularly
3 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding that the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to
enforce the political equality of the races but was not intended to abolish racial dis-
tinctions nor to enforce social equality). Thus, separate but equal facilities for blacks
and whites were not in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Jd. at 544.
4 RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE (1976).
5 Id. at 226.
6 Videotape: Liberators: Fighting on Two Fronts in World War II (Mile Educa-
tional Film Production, Inc., in association with Thirteen/WNET for the American
Experience 1992) (on file with author).
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tense. There was a screening of the documentary at the Apollo
Theater in Harlem and the New York Times reported that many of
the Blacks and Jews in attendance "hugged and passionately agreed
that the screening had provided a rare powerful moment-a ca-
tharsis in the sometimes tense relations between [B]lacks and Jews
in New York City."7 But its accuracy was soon questioned by indi-
viduals who claimed that the Black tank battalions were no where
near those camps when they were liberated.8
Whatever the merits of that controversy, I remember reading a
wonderful, very moving memoir by Elie Wiesel in which he said
that his war time experience included a memory of liberation of
the camp that he was in. I recall him stating: I will never forget the
faces of American soldiers and the horror that could be read on
them. I will especially remember one Black sergeant, a muscled
giant, who wept tears of impotent rage and shame. Shame for the
human species when he saw us. He spewed curses that on his lips
became holy words.
We know that at home during World War II, the wartime econ-
omy lifted America out of the depression. The rising tide had
lifted the boats of Black Americans too, and in the post war years
the winds of social change began to stir as African-Americans accel-
erated their struggle against segregation. The NAACP's fledgling
legal defense fund was established in 1940 and began litigating the
cases that paved the road to Brown.
A. Phillip Randolph, the leader of the Brotherhood of Sleep-
ing Car Porters, threatened a march on Washington in 1941 unless
President Roosevelt ended discrimination in the defense industry.9
Roosevelt responded with Executive Order 8802, The Fair Employ-
ment Practices Act,10 which banned discrimination by defense con-
7 Joseph B. Treaster, WNET Inquity Finds No Proof Black Unit Freed 2 Nazi Camps,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8, 1993, at B1.
8 See Richard Bernstein, Doubts MarPBS Film of Black Army Unit, N.Y. TImES, Mar. 1,
1993, at B1;Joseph B. Treaster, Film Halted On Blacks FreeingJews, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12,
1993, at B3.
9 See Lerone Bennett, Jr., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF BLACK AMERICA,
365-66 (1993).
10 Fair Employment Practices Act, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941). The executive order,
issued onJune 25, 1941, provided that "[a]l1 departments and agencies of the Govern-
ment of the United States concerned with vocational and training programs for de-
fense production shall take special measures appropriate to assure that such
programs are administered without discrimination because of race, creed, color, or
national origin" and that "[a] 11 contracting agencies of the Government of the United
States shall include in all defense contracts hereafter negotiated by them a provision
obligating the contractor not to discriminate against any worker because of race,
creed, color, or national origin." Id.
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tractors. The prospect of tens of thousands of Americans
converging on the Nation's capitol to protest racial discrimination
highlighted an awkward dilemma for a nation championing its role
in fighting against totalitarianism and oppression abroad.
After the war, in 1945, the foundation for the United Nations
was laid in its charter at a San Francisco conference led by the vic-
torious allied forces. By 1950, however, the two surviving super-
powers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were locked in a
bitter Cold War struggle that defined much of the second half of
the twentieth century. Simultaneously the post-World War II years
saw the emergence of African and Asian nations from the shadows
of colonialism onto a world stage in which the superpowers com-
peted for their allegiance, or at least their control. African-Ameri-
cans watched the end of the colonial era with the certain
knowledge that the winds of change that were shifting and blowing
abroad would not stop blowing at the borders of the United States.
The relationship between the struggles against racism here in
the United States and colonialism abroad was not newly noted.
There is a wonderful book on Plessy by Charles Lofgren" in which
he writes that the expansion of nineteenth century imperialism,
which lead to colonial rule over nonwhite people abroad, helped
to free the white south from whatever restraints national opinion
had imposed. 2 He understood that there was a connection even
at that time between imperialism and colonialism abroad and ra-
cism and segregation in the United States.
So, in a sense, the decision in Brown was about moral credibil-
ity at home and abroad. Again in Simple Justice, Richard Kluger
wrote that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown,
for all of its economy, represented nothing short of a recon-
secration of American ideals. At a moment when the [United
States] had just begun to sense the magnitude of its global ideo-
logical contest with communist authoritarianism and was quick
to measure its own worth in terms of megaton power, the opin-
ion of the Court said that the United States still stood for some-
thing more than material abundance, still moved to an inner
spirit, however deeply it had been submerged by fear and envy
and mindless hate.... The Court had restored to the American
people a measure of humanity that had been drained away in
their climb to worldwide supremacy."i
11 CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION
(1987).
12 Id.
13 KLUGER, supra note 4, at 710.
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Whether Brown actually did all these things as Kluger was stirred to
write is debatable, but the fact that the decision had implications
for America's global standing is not. The United States could no
longer claim to carry a banner of democracy against totalitarianism
when it denied millions of its own citizens basic civil and human
rights.
Justice Robert Jackson once acknowledged the "profound
change" in public opinion that had occurred in recent years as a
consequence of American awareness that the racism which gener-
ated the Holocaust and "revulsion" against the kind of racial feel-
ing that "lead to the internment of Japanese during World War II
would have an affect on the question of race in America."14 I recall
that John Fasset, who clerked for Justice Stanley Reed during the
1953-54 term, attempted to move his Justice from his prosegrega-
tion position to a position against segregation by arguing that seg-
regation at home affected America's standing abroad. Fasset's
account of Reed's response was to the effect that Reed had heard a
lot on that subject and had been giving it considerable thought. So
the Brown decision was necessary if the United States was to stake a
claim of moral high ground in its battle against communism and
the Justices of the Supreme Court knew it.
Beyond the Court brimmed the broader Civil Rights Move-
ment that drew inspiration from anti-colonial struggles. Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr. readily acknowledged the effect of Mahatma
Ghandi's philosophy of non-violent resistance employed during
the Montgomery boycott.' 5 This philosophy was shared by a minis-
ter who is a central figure in a book called The Children.6 The
book begins by looking at the sit-in movement in Nashville, and
Reverend James Lawson, who is now out in Los Angeles, had a
profound impact because he had been in India studying Ghandi
and brought it home.' 7 Thereafter, he met Dr. King who con-
vinced him to come to work in the South.' 8
The African diaspora was rich with cross-fertilization. Presi-
dent Kwamane Kwuma of Ghana was educated at Lincoln Univer-
sity in Pennsylvania. The great W.B. Dubois' ideological sojourn
took him from integrationist to socialist to pan-Africanist to ex-
14 Memorandum from Justice Robert Jackson (Feb. 15, 1954) (on file with
author).
15 See Taylor Branch, PARTING THE WATERS 143-205 (1988) (use of nonviolent
Gandhian methods during the Montgomery Bus Boycott).
16 DAVID HALBERSTAM, THE CHILDREN (1998).
17 See id. at 47-49.
18 See Branch, supra note 15, at 205.
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patriate. He spent his last days in Ghana. He died there on the eve
of the great march on Washington. Thurgood Marshall played a
central role in drafting the Constitution of Kenya. Elijah Moham-
med and his charismatic lieutenant Malcolm X each visited Arab
and African nations on their respective Haj, required by Islam. Af-
rican-Americans expanded the range of integrationist, separatists,
and pan-African ideologies and paid homage to the influence of
African liberation struggles. Martin Luther King, Jr. wrote in a
1961 essay that "[t]he liberation struggle in Africa has been the
greatest single international influence on American Negro stu-
dents."19 He went on to say, "[firequently I hear them say that if
their African brothers can break the bonds of colonialism, surely
the American Negro can break Jim Crow. 20
Similarly, African nationalists were inspired by African-Ameri-
cans who struggled against racism. Nelson Mandela has written in
his biography Long Walk to Freedom21 that there was a kinship be-
tween black South Africans and African-Americans inspired by
such great Americans as W.E.B. Dubois, Marcus Garvey, and Martin
Luther King, Jr. As a young man, he said, "I idolized the Brown
Bomber Joe Louis, who took on not only his opponents in the ring
but racists outside of it." 22
In spite of the United States' concern with its international
standing that was part of the context of the Brown decision, and in
spite of the deep well of international cross-fertilization between
freedom fighters throughout the African diaspora, the Civil Rights
Movement in the United States has never drawn significantly on
international human rights norms. The legal struggle for civil
rights in the United States has unfortunately been cramped by its
failure to develop a meaningful human rights paradigm based on
international covenants, despite the fact that the United States is a
signatory. This failure is compounded by the fact that following
the demise of the Civil Rights Movement in the late 1960s, the
struggle for civil rights has been largely waged in the courts. In the
absence of a social-political movement that creates the pressures
under which the inherently conservative judiciary will be com-
pelled to move beyond their status quo protection mode, there will
be no change.
19 Martin Luther King, Jr., The Time For Freedom Has Come, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
1961, § 6 (Magazine), at 118.
20 Id.
21 NELSON MANDELA, LONG WALK TO FREEDOM 583 (1995).
22 Id.
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The federal courts have grown increasingly more conservative
since the end of the Warren Court era. In the last decade, the
federal courts have rendered numerous decisions that have limited
the expansion of opportunities for racial minorities, women, and
other people who historically have been dispossessed, disen-
franchised, and unprivileged. The Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause has been
the point on which this turn of legal fortunes revolved. In addi-
tion, the Court's interpretation of civil rights statutes has also had
limiting effects on civil rights enforcement.
I would like to talk somewhat briefly about International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. 23
This document provides an expansive framework for advancing the
interests and opportunities of racial minorities and other groups
who have historically been marginalized in the United States by
American practice, policy, and law. In the process, we should con-
sider possible explanations for the limited nature of attempts on
the part of United States civil rights lawyers to utilize international
human rights norms. The Race Convention was adopted by a
unanimous General Assembly of the United Nations on December
21, 1965. The United States became a signatory on September 28,
1966, and ratified the Convention in June of 1994. It became oper-
ative in 1969. The state signatories elected an eighteen member
committee of international human rights experts who were
charged with the responsibility for monitoring compliance.
Among the considerations that constitute the preamble of the
Race Convention is a reference to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights24 and a proclamation that "all human beings are
born free and equal in dignity and rights and that everyone is enti-
tled to all the rights and freedoms set out therein, without distinc-
tion of any kind, in particular as to race, colour or national
origin. 25 Several other considerations of the Race Convention
merit attention. The Race Convention states that the United Na-
tions has "condemned colonialism and all practices of segregation
and discrimination associated therewith, in whatever form and
wherever they exist, and that the Declaration on the Granting of
23 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, [hereinafter Race
Convention].
24 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess. Pt. 1, Resolutions at 71 U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter
UDHR].
25 Id. at 212-14 (citing UDHR, supra note 24).
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Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of 14 December
1960, has affirmed and solemnly proclaimed the necessity of bring-
ing them to a speedy and unconditional end[.] 26
Nineteen sixty was an extraordinary year. In this year, African-
American students and others were sitting-in in Greensboro, North
Carolina. There were also sit-ins in Nashville, Tennessee and other
places around the South, initiating the demonstrations that set fire
to the Civil Rights Movement. In that same year, eleven African
nations moved from colonialism to independence. There was a
movement going on that did not know or respect international
borders. These movements, or this consciousness about these
movements, and these changes fueled one and the other respec-
tively. Whether intentionally or not, by condemning colonialism
and "practices of segregation and discrimination associated there-
with in whatever form and where they exist,"2 7 the General Assem-
bly was underscoring the tension between international norms and
practices within the United States. For as we have talked about al-
ready, domestic civil rights leaders and activists were keenly aware
of and inspired by African liberation struggles. The preamble to
the Race Convention further stated that the state party signatories
were "[c] onvinced that any doctrine of superiority based on racial
differentiation is scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially
unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justification for racial
discrimination, in theory or in practice anywhere[.]" 2" Although
the United States is a signatory to the Race Convention, this lan-
guage constitutes a ringing condemnation and rejection of racism
which has no parallel in United States law. While the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause prohibits discrimination on
the basis of race, and it has been interpreted to guarantee that gov-
ernmental actors shall not discriminate, it does not explicitly con-
demn the doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation.
Nor does any other federal constitutional or statutory provision. In
my view, the First Amendment29 would not be an impediment to
such a governmental condemnation of the theory of racial superi-
ority or inferiority, for individuals would still be free to believe
whatever they wanted to believe and express their views. So there is
no impediment constitutionally to such a condemnation, but it
does not exist in United States law.
26 Race Convention, supra note 23, at 214 (citations omitted).
27 Race Convention, supra note 23, at 214.
28 Race Convention, supra note 23, at 214 (emphasis added).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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The preamble to the Race Convention also reaffirms "that dis-
crimination between human beings on the grounds of race, colour
or ethnic origin i[s] an obstacle to friendly and peaceful relations
among nations and is capable of disturbing peace and security
among peoples and the harmony of persons living side by side even
within one and the same State."30 Recent conflicts in Croatia, Ser-
bia, Bosnia, as well as in Rawanda, Burendi and other places
around the world certainly bear witness to the tragic truth of that
statement.
The paradigm in the United States is the color blind paradigm
which arises from the dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson. Justice Harlan
was praised as being a visionary for this dissent. He wrote that
"[o] ur Constitution is color-blind, and neither knows nor tolerates
classes among citizens."3" But to fully understand that dissent,
which was more progressive of course than the majority opinion,
one has to read a few passages before, where Justice Harlan wrote:
The white race deems itself to be the dominate race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education,
in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will continue to be
for all time, if it remains true to its great heritage and holds fast
to the principles of constitutional liberty. But in the view of the
Constitution, in the eye of law, there is in this country no supe-
rior, dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here.3 2
Justice Harlan was talking about law, not fact, and clearly his view
was consistent with white supremacy. His dissent, though it may
have been courageous for its time, nonetheless reflects the fact that
his color blind constitution did not repudiate notions of white
supremacy.
Article 1 of the Race Convention defines racial discrimination
as:
any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on
race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, en-
joyment or exercise on an equal footing of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cul-
tural or any other field of public life.33
Note that intent is not the sole touchstone for Race Convention
purposes, as it is for the United States Constitution. Moreover, the
phrase "nullifying, impairing recognition, enjoyment or exercise"
30 Race Convention, supra note 23, at 214.
31 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896).
32 Id.
33 Race Convention, supra note 23, at 216 (emphasis added).
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conveys a broad purpose and the phrase "of human rights and fun-
damental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or
any other field of public life" a broad reach. Of key importance is
the interpretation of the ambiguous phrase "public life" which
could be interpreted consistently with the United States Constitu-
tion, meaning that it generally prohibits racial discrimination, as
the Equal Protection Clause does, by government, but not private
actors. Alternatively, "public life" could refer to the impersonal
spheres of activity in which individuals operate with the expecta-
tion that immutable characteristics will be irrelevant. The text of
the Race Convention strongly supports the latter interpretation.
The United States has voiced reservations about the Race Conven-
tion that reflect a difference between United States Constitutional
interpretation and the Race Convention. For example, Article
2(1) (a) of the Convention provides:
State parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to
pursue by all appropiate means and without delay a policy of
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting
understanding among all races, and, to this end: ... to engage
in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons,
groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that all public
authorities and public institutions, national and local, shall act
in conformity with this obligation [.] 34
Under United States law, I suppose the Fourteenth Amendment
has a comparable purpose and reach because it has been inter-
preted to prohibit racial classifications that are unsupported by a
compelling state interest and for which a less intrusive, racially neu-
tral alternative is available. 5 The Fifteenth Amendment applies in
a similar way to the area of voting.36 We also have relevant statu-
tory provisions, including Section 1983, 37 which prohibits discrimi-
nation by actors acting under color of state law. Thus the Race
Convention and United States law each place governmental dis-
crimination beyond the reach of the law. Article 2.1(b) provides
that "each [s]tate [p]arty undertakes not to sponsor, defend or
support racial discrimination by any persons or organizations." 3
34 Race Convention, supra note 23, at 218.
35 See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Ed. (holding that the school board's layoff policy of
extending preferential treatment to some employees because of their race or national
origin violated the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 908
(1996).
36 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § I ("The right of citizens . . . to vote shall not be
denied or abridged . . . on account of race").
37 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1994).
38 Race Convention, supra note 23, at 218.
[Vol. 3:19
1998] THE RACE CONVENTION AND CIVIL RIGHTS 29
In the United States we have Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act "9
that might have a similar reach and purpose. Additionally, Title IX
is aimed at prohibiting governmental entanglement with discrimi-
nation in reference to gender. ° So I suppose that the, match in
some ways.
United States Supreme Court precedent further buttresses the
concept that the federal government ought to aschew any kind of
support, however indirect on its part, for privately sponsored racial
discrimination.41 It is clear that nothing in United States law either
requires or allows the Federal Government to defend or support
racial discrimination. Although the First Amendment protects ra-
cist speech and expression, Article 2(1) (b) of the Race Convention
addresses discrimination, which arguably is at least one step be-
yond speech. Thus, the Convention seems to be consistent with
United States law on the issue of governmental involvement with,
or support for discrimination. Article 2 (1) (c) of the Race Conven-
tion requires each party to take effective measures to review gov-
ernmental, national and local policies and to amend, rescind or
nullify any laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or
perpetuating racial discrimination wherever it exists.4 2 This provi-
sion can be interpreted to apply to the governmental sphere, how-
ever, the phrase "wherever it exists" is open to an expansive
interpretation and may suggest a reach beyond governmental ac-
tion into the private sphere.
The principle of judicial review established in Marbury v.
Madison4 is relevant. In Cooper v. Aaron,'4 the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed and expanded its role as the final arbiter and interpreter of
the Constitution. Thus, the requirement in Article 2(1) (c) of the
3q 42 U.S.C. 2000d (1994).
40 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (1994).
41 See Bob Jones University v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 595-96 (1983) (holding
that because racial discrimination is contrary to public policy, private schools that
discriminate based on race are not conferring a public benefit and therefore they are
not entitled to tax exempt status).
42 Race Convention, supra note 23, at 218.
43 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
44 358 U.S. 1 (1958). In Cooper v. Aaron the Governor and the Legislature of Ar-
kansas argued that state officials were not required to obey federal court orders which
rested on the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the United States Con-
stitution. Id. at 4. More specifically, the Governor and Legislature of Arkansas argued
they were not bound by the Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education. Id. In
rejecting this argument, the Court noted that the United States Constitution is the
supreme law of the land and that, pursuant to Marbuv v. Madison, the Court is the
final arbiter of the law. Id. at 18. Thus the Court's interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment in Brown is binding on the States. Id.
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Race Convention that signatories review governmental laws, poli-
cies, and practices does not at first blush add anything to United
States anti-discrimination efforts. But in the area ofjudicial review,
applying post-Civil War amendments requires invalidation of dis-
criminatory governmental laws and regulations on the local, state,
and federal levels, again consistent with the Race Convention. But
the United States Constitution does not require remedial action
for government conduct that has "the effect of creating or perpetu-
ating racial discrimination." Intent is the sole touchstone, and it
has been and is being used in a way that makes it particularly diffi-
cult to win cases on behalf of people of color in which racial dis-
crimination is alleged.
There is a lot in the Race Convention that is consistent with
United States law, but clearly the Race Convention reaches further.
The Race Convention's effects test is significantly more liberal in
terms of proving intent than the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause has been interpreted.4 5 Additionally, the Race
Convention reaches out to prohibit not only discriminatory actions
but discriminatory, racist speech.
In the United States, racist speech is protected by the Constitu-
tion and the First Amendment is applied vehemently to protect
anyone's right to harbor racist beliefs or to engage in such speech.
Frankly, a great deal of conduct, including cross burning, is pro-
tected under the First Amendment as well.46 Under the Race Con-
vention such racist speech would be prohibited. When the
Fourteenth Amendment was interpreted to apply to corporations
in the Slaughter House Cases,47 and when the Court decided Plessy in
1896, the Fourteenth Amendment held little meaning for African-
Americans. This occurred despite the fact it was the plight of Afri-
45 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) ("our cases have not em-
braced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it
reflects a racially discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a
racially disproportionate impact.").
46 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). In R.A. V., the petitioner was charged
under the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime Ordinance after burning a cross on an Afri-
can-American family's lawn. Id. at 379-80. Petitioner moved to dismiss on First
Amendment grounds. Id. at 380. The Court held the ordinance was facially unconsti-
tutional because it prohibited speech that would be otherwise permissible if not for
the subjects the speech addressed. In writing the opinion, Justice Scalia stated "[St.
Paul] has proscribed fighting words of whatever manner that communicates messages
of racial, gender, or religious intolerance. Selectivity of this sort creates the possibility
that the city is seeking to handicap the expression of particular ideas. That possibility
would alone be enough to render the ordinance presumptively invalid[.]" Id. at 393-
94.
47 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
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can-Americans that originally called the Fourteenth Amendment
into being.48 It has been an odd history, a peculiar history. There
has been nothing comparable to international human rights norms
and the Race Convention in United States history that would be as
meaningful for African-Americans. In fact, if you think about it,
United States law is not couched in terms of positive obligations; it
is all anti-discrimination principles, not affirmative obligations con-
cerning integration and multiculturalism.
Interestingly enough, when the Supreme Court has spoken
about integration and multiculturalism, it has worked against Afri-
can-Americans and people of color. In Shaw v. Reno,49 for exam-
ple, Justice O'Connor, writing for the five-four majority, castigated
North Carolina's 53% Black 12th Congressional District which was
drawn pursuant to the Voting Rights Act5" to remedy a long history
of discrimination and racial polarization.51 In doing so she cited
Justice Douglas' dissent in Wright v. Rockefeller.52 I love this lan-
guage: Justice O'Connor says that she was concerned that these
districts imperil "'the multiracial, multireligious communities that
our Constitution seeks to weld together as one.""'
Interestingly, Shaw's resurrection of the notion of welding to-
gether multiracial and multicultural communities stands in stark
contrast with a long line of Supreme Court cases that have ruled
against African-Americans and people of color who sought integra-
tion and multiracial communities. For example, in Keyes v. School
District No. 1,54 the United States Supreme Court held that the Con-
stitution does not require a remedy for de facto school segrega-
tion.55 In Milliken v. Bradley,56 the Court held that interdistrict
school desegregation was not available unless almost insurmounta-
ble barriers were met.57 In Missouri v. Jenkins, 58 the Court struck
down a planned order by the district court to voluntarily integrate
48 See id. at 71-72.
49 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
50 Voting Rights Act of 1965, 79 stat. 439, 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c).
51 See Shaw, 509 U.S. at 633.
52 376 U.S. 52 (1964).
53 509 U.S. at 648 (quoting Wright v. Rockefeller, 376 U.S. at 67) (Goldberg, J.
dissenting).
54 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
55 See id. at 208.
56 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
57 See id. at 744-45 ("it must be shown that racially discriminatory acts of the state
or local school districts, or of a single school district have been a substantial cause of
interdistrict segregation.").
58 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
NEW YORK CITY LAW REVIEW
the Kansas City School district using suburban schools. 9 So this
notion about an affirmative duty to weld together racial communi-
ties is has been expressed in cases where African-Americans have
come out on the losing end. Yet it has not existed in cases when
African-Americans and Latinos have sought those very same reme-
dies. There is at least an inconsistency; some would suggest a
hypocrisy.
I would like to talk about what I think is the wellspring of
Equal Protection law in the United States. It did not come out of
any race discrimination case; it came out of the 1938 decision in
United States v. Carolene Products.' This case had to do with regula-
tion of the milk industry,6" butjust kind of thrown in there was the
famous footnote four written by Justice Stone:
It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which
restricts those political processes which can ordinarily be ex-
pected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is to be
subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general
prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other
types of legislation.... Nor do we need enquire whether similar
considerations may enter into the review of statutes directed at
particular religious or national or racial minorities: whether
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a spe-
cial condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of
those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.6 2
Now that is powerful language when you think about it. That is
language that says given our history of discrimination the political
system does not work for minority group members who are discrete
and insular. We have to do something more.
Of course this language has been transformed. Today there is
no focus on "discrete and insular minorities." It has been dropped
out so that discrimination on the basis of race is found to exist even
where governmental action or private actors are aiming at includ-
ing people as opposed to excluding them. Now that has stood the
Fourteenth Amendment Equal Protection Clause on its head. And
5q See id. at 96-98.
60 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
61 The issue in Carolene Products was whether the Filled Milk Act exceeded Con-
gress' power under the Commerce Clause and whether the Act ran afoul of the Fifth
Amendment. Id. at 145-46.
62 Id. at 152-53 n.4 (citations omitted).
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that is why today we are engaged in the so called "reverse discrimi-
nation" battles.
For sixty years, under Carolene Products, the Equal Protection
Clause was interpreted to provide special protection for discrete
and insular minorities. Now the federal courts have said in a series
of cases, starting with Richmond v. Croson,63 and again in Adarand
Constructors v. Pena,64 the Fifth Circuit said it in Hopwood v. Texas,6 5
and we heard it recently in Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod v. Federal
Communications Commission, 6 that there is no difference between
attempts to include and attempts to exclude. The courts are now
equating race with racism, so the problem is race, not racism, and
not white supremacy. Therefore any race consciousness is uncon-
stitutional and unlawful.
This lack of distinction would not occur under the Race Con-
vention because it specifically has two provisions relevant to affirm-
ative action. Article 1(4) accepts "special measures taken for the
sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or
ethnic groups or individuals" from the definition of racial discrimi-
nation, as long as such measures do not "lead to the maintenance
of separate rights for different racial groups and they shall not be
continued after the objectives for which they are taken have been
achieved."6 7 Similarly, Article 2(2) states:
[p]arties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take in the
social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete
measures to ensure the adequate development and protection
of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for
the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment
of human fights and fundamental freedoms. These measures
shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of une-
qual or separate rights for different racial groups after the objec-
tives for which they were taken have been achieved. 68
Both provisions are a clear and unambiguous basis for affirmative
63 488 U.S. 469, 494 (1989) ("the standard of review inder the Equal Protection
Clause is not dependent on the race of those burdened or benefited by a particular
classification.") (citations omitted).
64 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995).
65 78 F.3d 932, 940 (5th Cir. 1996) ("there is now absolutely no doubt that courts
are to employ strict scrutiny when evaluating all racial classifications, including those
characterized by their proponents as 'benign' or 'remedial."') (footnotes omitted).
66 141 F.3d 344, 351 (D.C. Cir. 1998) ("Though the Supreme Court did not ini-
tially apply strict scrutiny to federal 'affirmative action' programs, it recently reversed
itself to hold that strict scrutiny applies whether or not the Government's motivation
to aid minorities can be thought 'benign."') (citations omitted).
67 Race Convention, supra note 23, at 216.
68 Race Convention, supra note 23, at 218.
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action that are unlike anything that exists in American law. They
are in total contradiction to the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions in Croson and in Adarand. The United States draws no distinc-
tion between race-based affirmative action aimed at including
minority group members and invidious racial discrimination aimed
at excluding them. This is a fundamental flaw.
I would like to make some observations about the prospects
for domestic application of the Race Convention. Civil rights law-
yers in the United States have made limited use of the Race Con-
vention and other international human rights norms. I think the
Brown decision and the campaign that led to it created a paradigm
that has held sway over the Civil Rights Movement for a long time.
If, as we have seen, international events and human rights norms
are the context in which Brown was decided, the lawyers who liti-
gated Brown understandably believed that domestic law was suffi-
cient to dismantle American apartheid. In any event, their reliance
on international law was extremely limited.
In Colker v. Georgia,69 in which the Supreme Court invalidated
the death penalty for rape,7" the Legal Defense Fund argued that
other nations did not apply capitol punishment to rape. The
Supreme Court largely ignored that argument. It didn't rule on it,
didn't pass on it, just ignored it. Other efforts to link civil rights to
international human rights norms have met with tepid results.
I think perhaps the failure of United States lawyers to call
upon international human rights norms, such as those in the Race
Convention, reflects a combination of factors. First, and ironically
given the international scenario which provided the context in
which Brown was decided, Brown was a redemption and a reaffirma-
tion of the United States Constitution. It immediately transformed
United States legal culture and created an expectation that
through the Constitution it was possible to enforce the rights of
racial minorities and indeed women and all Americans to be free
from discrimination. Moreover, the Brown campaign fostered the
perception that it was possible to engage in a long-term struggle for
social change while using the law, i.e., United States law could be
used as a weapon. Even though it turned out to be effective in
Brown, given the conservative and reactive nature of the law that
belief merits substantial skepticism. While a litigation campaign
69 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
70 See id. at 592 (holding a sentence of death is grossly disproportionate and exces-
sive punishment for the crime of rape constituting cruel and unusual punishment
forbidden by the Eighth Amendment).
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may be a necessary and sometimes even a crucial part or element
of the battle for social justice, it is not the only front; it cannot be
the only front.
While Brown was a breakthrough victory it should not obscure
other factors that made it possible to bring about social change.
These factors included the pressure of international scrutiny after
World War II, the Cold War era, and United States hypocrisy.
Moreover, the Brown decision should not lead to the conclusion
that domestic law is sufficient to provide holistic protection of civil
and human rights. While Brown broke the back of American
apartheid, the courts have for the most part been reluctant partici-
pants in the struggle for racial justice, or social justice more
broadly. Civil rights lawyers and other who believe the Brown para-
digm would be a model for social change may be unduly optimistic
if they ignore the contextual conditions, including international
pressure, that made the school desegregation decision possible.
This is in no way to diminish the importance of litigation in the
struggle for social justice. I would be cutting my own throat if I did
that. The point is that the legal struggle is most effective when it is
part of a broader struggle, and that in an increasingly global com-
munity international covenants and treaties governing human
rights should be given force and effect. Additionally, there should
be political and social activism to bring that change about.
While civil rights lawyers may have censured international
human rights standards from their briefs and arguments after mak-
ing the essentially correct judgment that the United States courts
would be unreceptive, they may have also thereby eschewed the
opportunity to build a broader set of expectations for governmen-
tal and private behavior. That is to say, they passed up the oppor-
tunity to bring human rights discourse into American political
discourse. Put differently, in the absence of advocacy, human
rights norms such as the Race Convention will have no currency in
the United States. Even if courts initially fail to address such argu-
ments, in time their presentation may erode the unspoken assump-
tion that they are wholly irrelevant to our legal system. Lawyers
always have to balance the classic dilemma of when to advance an
argument that may lose, and therefore create bad precedent,
against the consideration of bringing the argument and beginning
to build a basis for a change in law. That is a judgment that has to
be made on a case by case basis, but it should not lead us to shrink
from introducing human rights norms into our litigation.
Domestic civil rights groups in the United States are begin-
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ning to awaken to the significance of international human rights
norms and covenants such as the Race Convention. And it is not
only race. Obviously it is gender, disability, national origin, reli-
gion, and all of the covenants that we are talking about here at this
Conference.
In a letter to Secretary of State Warren Christopher,71 the
Legal Defense Fund, prodded by other activists, joined two promi-
nent international human rights organizations, the International
Human Rights Law Group and Human Rights Watch. The letter
expressed concern over the United States ratification package
which appeared designed to minimize the treaties impact on
United States law and practice, and to insulate our legal system
from international legal scrutiny.72 The letter noted that the
United States ratified the Convention with the declaration that it is
"non-self-executing" and urged that it was nonetheless binding on
the United States.73 The State Department has yet to issue its re-
port. It is long overdue and this is under an administration that is
supposed to have a high degree of consciousness. Of course what
we have learned is that when you get your friends in government it
is sometimes a mixed blessing. You may not criticize them in a way
you criticize the people who are your adversaries when they are in
office. But these issues and many others are much too important
to let our friends off the hook. We have to press now while they are
in office because chances are we will get a better result, I would
hope, than when they are not. But also because its the right thing
to do.
Efforts like these are perhaps the most productive at changing
the expectation about the relevance of international human rights
law to the United States. Presently, any expectation that the Fed-
eral Judiciary will find the Race Convention or other conventions
to be applicable in Courts of the United States is probably unrealis-
tic. We can barely hold on to the positive law that we have estab-
lished under domestic law without expecting these judges to
expand international rights. But without a change in the political
discourse which positions the United States as a ratifying signatory
state to the convention with attendant obligations, the Race Con-
vention will have little domestic effect. That change, however
slowly, will come.
71 Letter from NAACP Legal Defense Fund, to Secretary of State Warren Christo-
pher (1995) (on file with author).
72 Id.
73 Id.
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In a world where national boundaries have been eclipsed by a
global economy that requires international and supernational eco-
nomic pacts, and in a world in which the demographics are chang-
ing nations, people are migrating across borders in ways that we
never have before, walls erected to keep international human
rights norms at bay will become an anomaly. They eventually will
shrink in their effectiveness, until they become obsolete. They will
be overrun, they will crumble, going the way of all such walls which
are erected to keep people from greater freedom. Meanwhile, it is
our task to work not only as lawyers, and perhaps not primarily as
lawyers, but rather in our roles as activists. This is a different role I
think, often it is anyway, to bring about a change in social discourse
in the United States.
I started out as a civil rights lawyer focused on race in the
United States and quickly found out that I cannot be confined to
concern about race, if only because my own self interest would not
allow me to be concerned only about race. Because for example,
laws made in the area of gender discrimination would also be ap-
plicable to race. So, if I was that narrow minded certainly my self
interest should move me beyond sole consideration of what ap-
pears to apply to me. But also because in time I came to see that it
is not enough to be against racism because one happens to be an
African-American. It is not enough to be against sexism because
one happens to be a woman. It is not enough to be against anti-
Semitism because one happens to be ajew. One has to be opposed
to all of these "isms" because they are wrong. And if we are not
opposed to them because they are wrong, than we have no moral
claim to ask other people to join us in our struggle. And if we
cannot ask others to join us in our struggle, we cannot build the
coalitions that are necessary to win our struggles. And then when
we grow beyond those domestic concerns, which are artificial, we
find out that those "isms" are worldwide concerns. And when we
travel to other nations and meet other people so that they do not
appear to be strange foreigners, viewed only in celluloid clips, but
rather they are flesh and blood human beings who share the same
goals and aspirations, wants and desires, passions and love and hate
as we do, then you find out that there is only one world and that it
is utterly insufficient for us to think of ourselves as civil rights law-
yers, civil rights activists, as those who are interested only in domes-
tic issues. We have to be concerned about global issues and about
justice beyond our immediate persons, our immediate selves, our
communities, our families, even our borders.
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One of the great opportunities of my life has been the oppor-
tunity to travel throughout Europe, Africa, and through some parts
of Asia, and to work with other people who share the common
spirit of commitment to social and economic justice. It has been
one of the most invigorating and inspiring things that I have done.
When I was in Japan recently, I was sitting with some folks who
were working as activists on employment issues. I could not speak
a lick ofJapanese. They could speak some English and understand
what I was saying. The bottom line was they were my kind of peo-
ple. In fact, they were my people even though they were different
ethnically and physically and they spoke a different language. I
recognized them, I related to them, I understood them. And they
were different from the other kind of people who I also recognized
when I was over there who were committed to economic privilege
as their priority. I think that the twenty first century is going to be
an exciting time and as we see increased globalization this is going
to be the issue. This and economic justice are going to be the is-
sues on which we struggle and fight. We are very fortunate to be
part of that struggle.
W.E.B DuBois wrote a wonderful poem entitled "Credo"7 4
which states, "I believe in the Prince of Peace. I believe that War is
Murder. I believe that armies and navies are at bottom the tinsel
and braggadocio of oppression and wrong; and I believe that the
wicked conquest of weaker and darker nations by nations whiter
and stronger but foreshadows the death of that strength."75 He
wrote that almost a hundred years ago and it is still true. This is
our struggle and it is one that we cannot win if we think of our-
selves only as Americans.
74 W.E.B. DuBois, Credo, THE INDEPENDENT, Oct. 6, 1904, at 787, reprinted in W.E.B.
DuBois: A READER 105 (David Levering Lewis ed. 1995).
75 Id. at 105.
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